Re: The Bigger, Badder, Even More Serious Thread [2]

[Pettytyrant101]

An independent body is looking into the Hillsborough disaster -at which 96 fans were killed in a terrible crush, and which the police blamed on fans whilst covering up their own failings and changing reports to put the blame onto the deceased, whilst at the same time feeding horrific misleading and untrue stories about the deceased to the press and parliament.

Just to give you a full flavour of the nastiness of what the police did in their coverup here's a few headlines and fron pages from the time: (and do bear in mind the families of the dead were still in shock and grief at this time and then had to read this stuff)-







'The Hillsborough Independent Panel last month revealed 164 police statements were altered - 116 of them to remove or change negative comments about the policing of the FA Cup semi-final between Liverpool and Nottingham Forest at the Sheffield stadium.It said police and emergency services had made "strenuous attempts" to deflect the blame for the disaster on to fans. The panel also found that 41 of the 96 who died had the "potential to survive" - BBC


So far there is mutterings but no concrete threats of prosecutions- why not?
If the police altered 116 out of 164 on the spot reports from the day- then surely each of those 116 cops should be charged with 'perverting the course of justice'- a civvy would be if they had covered up in a crime and lied to others to conceal it and tampered with official reports to hide their own guilt- why not the cops and why not come out and say there will be criminal charges?
Indeed why havent those 116 been arrested already given the commission looking into found they had tamepred with reports to cover up and shift blame to the fans? Surely that is already enough to arrest - I'm damned sure it would be if it was anyone else but the police who acted in this disgusting and disgraceful way.

[Eldorion]

I haven't followed this closely but my impression when reading about the report a few weeks ago was that the 116 accounts were altered after the fact by higher-ups. It sounds like the 116 were those actually willing to stand up and denounce the police actions. Is there evidence to indicate either way if the accounts were altered by the officers who gave them or by others in the department?

[Pettytyrant101]

There has been a fair bit of updated news on whatis happening over the course of the day (I will get to the question you raise Eldo- just want to bring things up to date first).

'The IPCC (Independent Police Complaints Commission) watchdog and director of public prosecutions have announced they will both launch inquiries into possible crimes committed by police.
The IPCC said both serving and former officers would be investigated over the deaths of 96 Liverpool fans in 1989.
The Hillsborough Family Support Group said it was "too good to be true".
The Director of Public Prosecutions Keir Starmer will review evidence relating to how the 96 fans died, which could lead to charges of manslaughter through gross negligence.
Meanwhile, the IPCC said it would look at whether there was a criminal cover-up by South Yorkshire Police of failings by the force.
A "large number" of current and former officers now face investigation.' -BBC


And now to go back to your question Eldo- I've had a deeper look into it and the enquiry set up (thanks to pressure from the families and support groups on consecutive governments for 23 years) made the following finding regarding the police notebooks and statements:

'A letter from the panel set up to scrutinise the evidence said it was aware officers had been put under pressure to amend their statements.'

and also-

'A PC Michael Walpole had included comments in his statement about the lack of organisation or radio messages to officers on the ground. These were also removed for the final draft.
When asked about the deleted paragraphs in 1998, PC Walpole said he was suffering post traumatic stress and depression and agreed to the deletions.'

So the answer seems to be yes individual officers did pervert the course of justice by either altering a statement themselves or allowing alteration of it.
But they only did this because of pressure from Senior Officers above.

[Orwell]

"The Director of Public Prosecutions Keir Starmer will review evidence relating to how the 96 fans died, which could lead to charges of manslaughter through gross negligence."

What was the actual negligence talked about here?

[Pettytyrant101]

I've been having a look for you Orwell and as far as I can see these would seem to be the pertinent bits-

"The flaws in responding to the emerging crisis on the day were
rooted in institutional tension within and between organisations.

"This was reflected in: a policing and stewarding mindset predominantly concerned with crowd disorder; the failure to realise the consequences of opening exit gates to relieve congestion at the turnstiles; the failure to manage the crowd's entry and allocation between the pens; the failure to anticipate the consequences within the central pens of not sealing the tunnel; the delay in realising that the crisis in the central pens was a consequence of overcrowding rather thancrowd disorder.
"Not only was there delay in recognising that there were mass casualties, the major incident plan was not correctly activated and onlylimited parts were then put into effect. As a result, rescue and recovery efforts were affected by lack of leadership, co-ordination, prioritisation of casualties and equipment."

[Orwell]

What responsibilities belonged to Ground Staff? Did they have no procedures in place for evacuations and crowd placement generally? Fire drills?

EDIT: Ground Staff as in the Authorities and Staff that looked after the whole running of the stadium, I mean.

[Pettytyrant101]

The ground staff and stewards are supposed to work with the police on those issues with the police having overall control and authority.
In the UK the police are responsible for, well, policing the match, the stewards although employed by the home club should be working with the police and be coordinating with them and be in contact with them throughout the game.
But as far as where the buck stops- its with the police. But thats because they wanted it that way, they wanted to have complete control over match crowds (particularly in the 1980's when violent hooliganism was commonplace).

[Orwell]

There still seems a nonsense involved. The police wanted control over everything to do with match day safety and co-ordination of ALL things? A recipe for disaster. Police don't have Magic Wands. You can't seriously control everything. That implies every cop there had to have an intimate knowledge of every detail regarding the layout and functioning of the place. Arrogant of the Police Chiefs to think their troops did. Did the average cop have several training days on the stadium and all things to do with it? I bet, No. Surely Stadium Authorities should have opposed it (out of Commonsense). And Politicians too (out of sheer political nous). Any way I look at this, if there was a failing, it was a collective one, including the idiots who presumably caused the fire to happen to begin with. By the way, I'm not condoning cover ups - by anyone. I also dislike armchair expertism by people who talk and criticise a lot, but in my experience usually do little in society (in case they might be criticised for not being perfect themselves!)

[Pettytyrant101]

I think what is sticking in people craws is not just that there seems to have been not only wide spread incompetence at all levels in all the services, private and public- thats bad enough- but that they then went on to blame the fans for it when they knew it was not them, and to smear the fans, including the deceased for 23 years. To the very faces of the grieving families.
It was the police who fed stories of fans urinating on corpses of dead children, it was the police who handed over details on all the deceased to the press so they could paint victims as undesirables.
Thats whats really got people, myslef included, disgusted by this I think.

"It is evident from the disclosed documents that from the outset SYP sought to establish a case emphasising exceptional levels of drunkenness and aggression among Liverpool fans, alleging that many arrived at the stadium late, without tickets and determined to force entry.The panel also looked at the allegations of blame levelled against Liverpool fans in some newspapers, including The Sun."The documents disclosed to the panel show that the origin of
these serious allegations was a local Sheffield press agency informed by several SYP officers, an SYP Police Federation spokesperson and a local MP."They also demonstrate how the SYP Police Federation, supported informally by the SYP chief constable, sought to develop and publicise a version of events that focused on several police officers' allegations of drunkenness, ticketlessness and violence among a large number of Liverpool fans. This extended beyond the media to Parliament.
"Yet, from the mass of documents, television and CCTV coverage disclosed to the panel there is no evidence to support these allegations'

'Sun editor Dominic Mohan said: “Twenty-three years ago The Sun newspaper made a terrible mistake. We published an inaccurate and offensive story about the events at Hillsborough.
"We said it was the truth — it wasn’t. The Hillsborough Independent Panel has now established what really happened that day. It’s an appalling story and at the heart of it are the police’s attempts to smear Liverpool fans.
It’s a version of events that 23 years ago The Sun went along with and for that we’re deeply ashamed and profoundly sorry.” -The Sun

[Orwell]

I'd like to see a thorough account of what happened. I have only a very shallow knowledge of this tragedy. Nothing anyone in the crowd did in any way was a catalyst for what followed?

[Pettytyrant101]

'While opposing supporters were segregated in the stadium, Liverpool fans were allocated the Leppings Lane stand, accessed by a limited number of turnstiles.
As the entry point became overcrowded before kick-off, police ordered an exit gate to be opened, allowing supporters to enter a tunnel leading directly to two enclosures (pens). The ensuing influx of supporters caused crushing and some fans climbed over side fences to escape.
Moments after kick-off, a crush barrier broke and fans began to fall on top of each other.

For some time, problems at the front of the pen went unnoticed, except by those affected, as attention was absorbed by the match. At 3:06 pm the referee, Ray Lewis, on the advice of the police, stopped the match after fans climbed the fence in an effort to escape the crush and went onto the track. By this time, a small gate in the fence had been forced open and some fans escaped via this route, as others continued to climb over the fencing.
The police attempted to stop fans from spilling onto the pitch. Other fans were pulled to safety by fans in the West Stand above the Leppings Lane terrace. The intensity of the crush broke the crush barriers on the terraces. Holes in the perimeter fencing were made by fans desperately attempting to rescue others.

Those trapped were packed so tightly in the pens that many victims died of compressive asphyxa while standing. The crowd in the Leppings Lane Stand overspilled onto the pitch where many injured and traumatised fans who had climbed to safety congregated. Police, stewards and members of the St John Ambulance service were overwhelmed. Many uninjured fans assisted the injured; several attempted CPR and others tore down advertising hoardings to use as stretchers.

As events unfolded, some police officers were still deployed making a cordon three-quarters of the way down the pitch to prevent Liverpool supporters reaching the opposing supporters. Some fans tried to break through the cordon to ferry injured fans to waiting ambulances but were forcibly turned back. A total of 44 ambulances arrived but police
prevented all but one from entering the stadium.

Only 14 of the 96 fatalities arrived at hospital.

On 12 September 2012, the Hillsborough Independent Panel concluded that no Liverpool fans were responsible in any way for the disaster, and that its main cause was a "lack of police control" and crowd safety was "compromised at every level".

[Orwell]

Sounds very bizarre. A unique event where chaos set in? This all seen from the amchair of retrospectivity. After that, new procedudres and policies about huge crowds at stadiums were severely modified, were they? Police, Ground staff/authorities, ambulance procedures etc. etc. changed? Was letting in too many people known to be fraught with danger, or a generous act to let as many people in as possible see the game? A line between supporters on the pitch? Because police feared further chaos if enemy fans were to join together? In retrospect a bad decision? What if war had broken out? Probably not - in the spur of the moment, maybe police thought it a great risk too? Who knows?

Plenty to think about. Always easier to know the answers after the event. Not that we should not be prepared to learn from history. Not that we should condone anyone falsifying their version of events. Still seems to me like a whole lot of people - without malicious intent - inadverttently allowed the whole thing to occur. But lay the entire blame at someone. Yep, the police. Hindsight is a powerful thing. The biggest mistake was allowing so many unruly people in to watch their favorite team. Yes, we know that now. The rest sounds like chaos for which nearly everyone must take at least some responsibility.

On 12 September 2012, the Hillsborough Independent Panel concluded that no Liverpool fans were responsible in any way for the disaster, and that its main cause was a "lack of police control" and crowd safety was "compromised at every level". A very politically correct and populist way to apportion the entire blame, but no one likes the police. Fair enough.

[David H]

Not that we should not be prepared to learn from history. Not that we should condone anyone falsifying their version of events. Still seems to me like a whole lot of people - without malicious intent - inadverttently allowed the whole thing to occur.

This seems like the heart of the matter to me.

The big issue that I see with the police behavior in this case is not that one or two officers falsified their stories, but that there is an appearance that a large number of them very quickly came together to coordinate their stories and release them. That appearance creates instant mistrust in the whole police force regarding ethical conduct, and disrespect follows.

I'm sure it's the same when the police are questioning people. If you find one person is lying to you, you tend to mistrust them and want to dig deeper. If you find that several people are all lying to you and have taken the trouble to get their stories straight, you assume there is really something to hide!

[halfwise]

Whatever may have happened with crowd the control, the very fact that such crowd control is necessary lays the blame squarely on the fans.

The fact that such emotions can occur over a bunch of folks in team uniforms that nobody knows personally chasing a basically worthless piece of leather around a field is one of the several reasons I have never had any interest in professional sports and never will.

[Pettytyrant101]

Orwell I can understand that as a cop you tend to view things form that perspective- but in this case I feel you are defending the undefensible.
The Panel looked at over 450,000 documents, hours of testimony and cctv footage.

Here are the Panels findings from the Summary (its Shorter but this is not going to be a short post I am afraid- but I think establishing both the depth and detail of the enquiry and the failings in the policing is important here- the wrong people have been getting blamed and tarred for this for far to long)


'The documents disclosed to the Panel, however, reveal that the flaws in responding to the emerging crisis on the day were rooted in institutional tension within and between organisations.
This was reflected in: a policing and stewarding mindset predominantly concerned with crowd disorder; the failure to realise the consequences of opening exit gates to relieve congestion at the turnstiles; the failure to manage the crowd's entry and allocation between the pens; the failure to anticipate the consequences within the central pens of not sealing the tunnel; the delay in realising that the crisis in the central pens was a consequence of overcrowding rather than crowd disorder.
The SYP decision to replace the experienced match commander, Chief Superintendent Brian Mole, and appoint Chief Superintendent David Duckenfield who had minimal experience of policing at Hillsborough, just weeks before an FA Cup semi-final, has been previously criticised. None of the documents disclosed to the Panel indicated the rationale behind this decision.

A planning meeting attended by both senior officers was held less than a month before the match. The documents
disclosed to the Panel give no explanation for the non-attendance of the South Yorkshire Metropolitan Ambulance Service and the Fire Service at this meeting.

This mindset, directed particularly towards Liverpool fans, was clearly evident in SYP's submission to the Taylor Inquiry.
The SYP Operational Order concentrated primarily on the control and regulation of the crowd with no appropriate reference to crowd safety, crushing or evacuation of the stands/terraces.

From the documents disclosed to the Panel, the management roles and responsibilities of senior SYP officers were unclear, particularly the lines of communication, decision-making and information exchange between those responsible for policing outside the stadium and the ground commander inside the stadium.

There was clear evidence in the build-up to the match, both inside and outside the stadium, that turnstiles serving the Leppings Lane terrace could not process the required number of fans in time for the kick-off. Yet the growing danger
was ignored.

For a considerable period inside the Police Control Box it was clear from the near view of the central pens below, and the CCTV coverage of the turnstiles and pens, that serious problems of overcrowding were occurring at the turnstiles and in the pens. Senior police officers' decision-making was hampered by poor communications, a malfunctioning
radio system and the design of the Control Box.

Superintendent Roger Marshall was responsible for policing outside the stadium at the Leppings Lane end. As the crush at the turnstiles became severe he requested the opening of exit gates to allow fans into the stadium and relieve crowd pressure. He had no knowledge of the uneven distribution of fans on the Leppings Lane terrace. Similarly, the ground commander inside the stadium, Chief Superintendent Roger Greenwood, had no knowledge of the extreme situation developing outside the stadium.

The overview of both sites was the Control Box, with CCTV monitors and a near view of the central pens. Chief Superintendent Duckenfield acceded to Superintendent Marshall's request and authorised the opening of Gate
C. Despite a clear view from the Control Box and CCTV monitors, neither Chief Superintendent Duckenfield nor his assistant, the experienced Superintendent Bernard Murray, anticipated the impact on the already packed central pens of fans descending the tunnel directly opposite Gate C.

On opening Gate C there was no instruction given to the SYP officers inside the stadium to manage the flow and direction of the incoming crowd.

From the documents provided to the Panel it is clear that the crush at the Leppings Lane turnstiles outside the
stadium was not caused by fans arriving 'late' for the kick-off.

SYP officers with experience of the inner concourse and terrace access stated that previously they had controlled access to the tunnel once the central pens appeared to be full, particularly in 1988. The disclosed documents reveal that this information was deleted from some officers' statements.

Senior SYP officers denied knowledge of tunnel closures at previous semi-finals, particularly 1988. They placed responsibility for that information not being given at debriefings on the officers responsible for the closures. Yet SYP officers responsible for closing the tunnel access in 1988 claimed that they had acted under instructions from
senior officers.

Not only was there delay in recognising that there were mass casualties,the major incident plan was not correctly activated and only limited parts were then put into effect. As a result, rescue and recovery efforts were affected by lack of leadership, coordination, prioritisation of casualties and equipment.

Disclosed documents show that police officers, particularly senior officers, interpreted crowd unrest in the Leppings Lane terrace central pens as a sign of potential disorder, and consequently were slow to realise that spectators were being crushed, injured and killed.

Neither SYP nor the South Yorkshire Metropolitan Ambulance Service (SYMAS) fully activated the major incident procedure. Communications between all emergency services were imprecise and inappropriately worded, leading to delay, misunderstanding and a failure to deploy officers to take control and coordinate the emergency response.

The disclosed documents show clear and repeated evidence of failures in leadership and emergency response coordination. While this is understandable in the immediate moments of an overwhelming disaster, it was a situation that persisted for at least 45 minutes after injured spectators were released from the pens.

Immediately following identification, the intrusive questioning of bereaved relatives about the social and drinking habits of their loved ones was perceived as insensitive and irrelevant, and added to their distress.

The idea that alcohol contributed to the disaster was raised at an early stage, and has proved remarkably durable despite being dismissed by the Taylor Report. The disclosed documents confirm the repeated attempts that were made to find supporting evidence for this.
They also show that available evidence was significantly misinterpreted, including an attempt to establish a link between later arrival and drunkenness that was fundamentally flawed.
The weight placed on alcohol in the face of objective evidence of a pattern of consumption modest for a leisure event was inappropriate. It has since fuelled persistent and unsustainable assertions about drunken fan behaviour.

Disclosed documents provide no rationale for the Coroner's exceptional decision to take samples for blood alcohol measurement from all of the deceased.

The implicit and explicit use of a blood alcohol level of 80mg/100ml as a marker was unjustified. This level has
relevance to the rapid response times of individuals in charge of motor vehicles, but none to people attending a leisure event.

Analysis of the data demonstrates that the attempt to draw statistical correlation between the time of arrival and alcohol level was fundamentally flawed in six respects, and no such link could be deduced.


The weight placed on alcohol levels, particularly in the Coroner's summing up at the inquests, was inappropriate and
misleading. The pattern of alcohol consumption among those who died was unremarkable and not exceptional for a social or leisure occasion.

A document disclosed to the Panel has revealed that an attempt was made to impugn the reputations of the deceased by carrying out Police National Computer checks on those with a non-zero alcohol level.

Documents disclosed to the Panel by SYP show that on the morning after the disaster senior officers discussed privately the 'animalistic behaviour' of 'drunken marauding fans'

The disclosed documents show that in the immediate aftermath of the disaster SYP prioritised an internal investigation and the collection of self-taken, handwritten statements in preparation for the imminent
external inquiries and investigations. SYP Counsel advised that the police should approach its information-gathering exercise by considering themselves 'the accused'. A subsequent SYP internal report ('the Wain Report') informed the SYP submission to the Taylor Inquiry.
Key elements of the SYP submission emphasised exceptional, aggressive and unanticipated crowd behaviour: large numbers of ticketless, drunk and obstinate fans involved in a concerted action, even 'conspiracy', toenter the stadium.
Many of these issues were also raised in Professor Leonard Maunder's advice as one of the assessors to the Taylor Inquiry. The advice from the police assessor, Chief Constable of Lancashire Brian Johnson, criticised SYP's failure to review the 1988 Police Operational Order to identify 'shortcomings'; poor communications between senior officers;
and the consequent failure to divert the crowd away from the tunnel onceGate C had been opened.
The documents disclosed to the Panel show that SYP sought to avoid any admission of liability in the settlement of compensation claims and in contribution proceedings against other organisations. SYP officers who claimed compensation were pressured within the Force to withdraw their claims.
From the documents disclosed to the Panel it is apparent that the decision to gather self-taken recollections from SYP officers, rather than following the standard procedure of contemporaneous pocket-book entries as the foundation for formal Criminal Justice Act statements, originated in the immediate aftermath of the disaster on 16 and 17
April. The initial justification was to provide SYP and the Force solicitors with candid, 'warts-and-all' accounts from officers that would be used to inform SYP's submission to the Taylor Inquiry.
What followed, however, was an extensive process of review and alteration of the recollections and their transition to multi-purpose statements. The disclosed documents reveal confusion about the purpose of recollections, initially taken for SYP 'internal' purposes, and their subsequent use by the WMP investigation. It was brought into stark
relief in the confusion surrounding the status of statements presented to the Taylor Inquiry and the Inquiry's acceptance of the 'final versions' of the reviewed and altered statements.
The process of transition from self-taken recollections to formal Criminal Justice Act statements was presented as removing 'conjecture' and 'opinion' from the former, leaving only matters of 'fact' within thelatter. Disclosed correspondence between SYP and the Force solicitors reveals that comments within officers' statements 'unhelpful to the Force's case' were altered, deleted or qualified (rewritten by the SYP
team).

A significant number of SYP officers were uncomfortable with the methodology adopted in reviewing and altering
their initial accounts and with the role of the SYP solicitors in this process. Senior SYP officers, including the Chief Constable, were aware of these concerns and the disclosed 'Hillsborough updates' demonstrate their attempts to assuage these concerns. An SYP inquiry liaison team was available to provide junior officers with 'necessary information and assistance' prior to giving evidence to the Taylor Inquiry.

Examination of officers' statements shows that officers were discouraged from making criticisms of senior officers' responses, their management and deficiencies in the SYP operational response: 'key' words and descriptions such as 'chaotic' were counselled against and, if included, were deleted.

Some 116 of the 164 statements identified for substantive amendment were amended to remove or alter
comments unfavourable to SYP.

The disclosed documents show that blood alcohol levels were tested in some survivors who attended hospital, as well as in all those who died.
There is no record of these tests or their results in the medical notes of survivors, and in some there was no apparent medical reason for the test. The extent of this testing remains unknown.

There was no evidence to support the proposition that alcohol played any part in the genesis of the disaster and it is regrettable that those in positions of responsibility created and promoted a portrayal of drunkenness as contributing to the occurrence of the disaster and the ensuing loss of life without substantiating evidence.

Detective Chief Superintendent Nick Foster of the WMP investigation team informed the Stuart-Smith Scrutiny that in five out of a sample of six amended statements material should not have been removed. In one case he
'question[ed] the objectivity ... of the person vetting'.

In the days after the disaster the media, particularly the press, published allegations and counter-allegations apportioning blame. This came to a head on 19 April when a number of newspapers, The Sun being the most prominent, reported serious allegations about the behaviour of Liverpool fans before and during the unfolding tragedy. The documents disclosed to the Panel show that the origin of these serious allegations was a local Sheffield press agency informed by several SYP officers, an SYP Police Federation spokeperson and a local MP.
They also demonstrate how the SYP Police Federation, supported informally by the SYP Chief Constable, sought to develop and publicise a version of events that focused on several police officers' allegations of drunkenness, ticketlessness and violence among a large number of Liverpool fans. This extended beyond the media to Parliament.
Yet, from the mass of documents, television and CCTV coverage disclosed to the Panel there is no evidence to support these allegations other than a few isolated examples of aggressive or verbally abusive behaviour
clearly reflecting frustration and desperation.

As the severity of the disaster was becoming apparent, SYP Match Commander, Chief Superintendent David Duckenfield, told a falsehood to senior officials that Liverpool fans had broken into the stadium and caused an inrush into the central pens thus causing the fatal crush. While later discredited, this unfounded allegation was broadcast internationally and was the first explanation of the cause of the disaster to enter the
public domain.

Within days, further serious allegations emerged from unnamed sources, a Police Federation spokesperson and a
local Conservative MP, Irvine Patnick. These were that Liverpool fans had conspired to arrive late, many were without tickets, were exceptionally drunk and aggressive and determined to force entry into
the stadium.

On 19 April, four days after the disaster, The Sun newspaper published a front-page story under the banner headline, 'THE TRUTH', alleging that Liverpool fans had assaulted and urinated on police officers resuscitating the dying, stolen from the dead and verbally sexually abused an unconscious young woman. Although less prominently, and often with a lesser degree of certainty, other regional and national newspapers published similar allegations.

Given the broader press reporting of the allegations, the Panel sought to establish their origins. Documents disclosed to the Panel show that the allegations were filed by White's News Agency, a Sheffield-based company. They were based on meetings over three days between agency staff and several police officers, together with interviews with Irvine Patnick MP and the South Yorkshire Police Federation Secretary, Paul Middup.
From the documents, it is clear that Mr Patnick based his comments on a conversation with police officers on the evening of the disaster.

8 months after the disaster White's News Agency confirmed to the London Evening Standard that its filed stories originated from 'unsolicited' allegations made by 'high ranking' SYP officers to agency 'partners'. There were four separate police sources plus the interview with Mr Patnick. Together these sources were considered sufficient verification for the story to be considered factually accurate and it was distributed accordingly.

A further document records a meeting in Sheffield of Police Federation members on the morning of the publication of the controversial story in The Sun.
The Police Federation Secretary, Mr Middup, confirmed that 'putting our side of the story over to the press and media' had been his priority.

At the meeting police officers repeated many of the allegations published in the media. The Chief Constable joined the meeting and advised that the SYP case had to be pulled together and given to the Inquiry. A 'defence' had to be prepared and a 'rock solid story' presented.

Lord Justice Taylor's Interim Report condemned the evidence and testimony of senior police officers and rejected as exaggerated the allegations made against Liverpool fans. He stated categorically that fans' behaviour played no part in the disaster.

The meeting's afternoon session heard from unnamed police officers who repeated the allegations of exceptional levels of abuse, drunkenness and violence.

Consistent with Lord Justice Taylor's findings, the Panel found no evidence among the vast number of disclosed documents and many hours of video material to verify the serious allegations of exceptional levels
of drunkenness, ticketlessness or violence among Liverpool fans. There was no evidence that fans had conspired to arrive late at the stadium and force entry and no evidence that they stole from the dead and dying.
Documents show that fans became frustrated by the inadequate response to the unfolding tragedy. The vast majority of fans on the pitch assisted in rescuing and evacuating the injured and the dead.

[Norc]

this is the longest post I've ever seen. you should have an award.

[Eldorion]

You must have missed my most recent story in the Creative Corner.

[Norc]

that doesn't really count.. or.. (need to check)

[Norc]

that's like a story, not like a serious reply at a serious topic.. sort of

[Eldorion]

[Norc]

sorry. you're just not up for it ;D

[Pettytyrant101]

Still seems to me like a whole lot of people - without malicious intent - inadvertently allowed the whole thing to occur.-Orwell

I really dont know how you can say that Orwell.
There was malicous intent to doctor statements to cover their own failings and blame the innocent and victims.
There was malicous intent to smear the names of the deceased and the Liverpool fans in general.
There was malicous intent in continuing to smear the deceased for 23 years.

[Norc]

btw, Eldo. There hasn't been a long entry in the creative corner from your side in w while...

[Eldorion]

Yeah, I've been busy with school stuff and haven't been doing much writing in general lately. I'll get back into it eventually, though.

[Orwell]

Orwell I can understand that as a cop you tend to view things form that perspective- but in this case I feel you are defending the undefensible.
The Panel looked at over 450,000 documents, hours of testimony and cctv footage.

Here are the Panels findings from the Summary (its Shorter but this is not going to be a short post I am afraid- but I think establishing both the depth and detail of the enquiry and the failings in the policing is important here- the wrong people have been getting blamed and tarred for this for far to long)


'The documents disclosed to the Panel, however, reveal that the flaws in responding to the emerging crisis on the day were rooted in institutional tension within and between organisations.
This was reflected in: a policing and stewarding mindset predominantly concerned with crowd disorder; the failure to realise the consequences of opening exit gates to relieve congestion at the turnstiles; the failure to manage the crowd's entry and allocation between the pens; the failure to anticipate the consequences within the central pens of not sealing the tunnel; the delay in realising that the crisis in the central pens was a consequence of overcrowding rather than crowd disorder.
The SYP decision to replace the experienced match commander, Chief Superintendent Brian Mole, and appoint Chief Superintendent David Duckenfield who had minimal experience of policing at Hillsborough, just weeks before an FA Cup semi-final, has been previously criticised. None of the documents disclosed to the Panel indicated the rationale behind this decision.

A planning meeting attended by both senior officers was held less than a month before the match. The documents
disclosed to the Panel give no explanation for the non-attendance of the South Yorkshire Metropolitan Ambulance Service and the Fire Service at this meeting.

This mindset, directed particularly towards Liverpool fans, was clearly evident in SYP's submission to the Taylor Inquiry.
The SYP Operational Order concentrated primarily on the control and regulation of the crowd with no appropriate reference to crowd safety, crushing or evacuation of the stands/terraces.

From the documents disclosed to the Panel, the management roles and responsibilities of senior SYP officers were unclear, particularly the lines of communication, decision-making and information exchange between those responsible for policing outside the stadium and the ground commander inside the stadium.

There was clear evidence in the build-up to the match, both inside and outside the stadium, that turnstiles serving the Leppings Lane terrace could not process the required number of fans in time for the kick-off. Yet the growing danger
was ignored.

For a considerable period inside the Police Control Box it was clear from the near view of the central pens below, and the CCTV coverage of the turnstiles and pens, that serious problems of overcrowding were occurring at the turnstiles and in the pens. Senior police officers' decision-making was hampered by poor communications, a malfunctioning
radio system and the design of the Control Box.

Superintendent Roger Marshall was responsible for policing outside the stadium at the Leppings Lane end. As the crush at the turnstiles became severe he requested the opening of exit gates to allow fans into the stadium and relieve crowd pressure. He had no knowledge of the uneven distribution of fans on the Leppings Lane terrace. Similarly, the ground commander inside the stadium, Chief Superintendent Roger Greenwood, had no knowledge of the extreme situation developing outside the stadium.

The overview of both sites was the Control Box, with CCTV monitors and a near view of the central pens. Chief Superintendent Duckenfield acceded to Superintendent Marshall's request and authorised the opening of Gate
C. Despite a clear view from the Control Box and CCTV monitors, neither Chief Superintendent Duckenfield nor his assistant, the experienced Superintendent Bernard Murray, anticipated the impact on the already packed central pens of fans descending the tunnel directly opposite Gate C.

On opening Gate C there was no instruction given to the SYP officers inside the stadium to manage the flow and direction of the incoming crowd.

From the documents provided to the Panel it is clear that the crush at the Leppings Lane turnstiles outside the
stadium was not caused by fans arriving 'late' for the kick-off.

SYP officers with experience of the inner concourse and terrace access stated that previously they had controlled access to the tunnel once the central pens appeared to be full, particularly in 1988. The disclosed documents reveal that this information was deleted from some officers' statements.

Senior SYP officers denied knowledge of tunnel closures at previous semi-finals, particularly 1988. They placed responsibility for that information not being given at debriefings on the officers responsible for the closures. Yet SYP officers responsible for closing the tunnel access in 1988 claimed that they had acted under instructions from
senior officers.

Not only was there delay in recognising that there were mass casualties,the major incident plan was not correctly activated and only limited parts were then put into effect. As a result, rescue and recovery efforts were affected by lack of leadership, coordination, prioritisation of casualties and equipment.

Disclosed documents show that police officers, particularly senior officers, interpreted crowd unrest in the Leppings Lane terrace central pens as a sign of potential disorder, and consequently were slow to realise that spectators were being crushed, injured and killed.

Neither SYP nor the South Yorkshire Metropolitan Ambulance Service (SYMAS) fully activated the major incident procedure. Communications between all emergency services were imprecise and inappropriately worded, leading to delay, misunderstanding and a failure to deploy officers to take control and coordinate the emergency response.

The disclosed documents show clear and repeated evidence of failures in leadership and emergency response coordination. While this is understandable in the immediate moments of an overwhelming disaster, it was a situation that persisted for at least 45 minutes after injured spectators were released from the pens.

Immediately following identification, the intrusive questioning of bereaved relatives about the social and drinking habits of their loved ones was perceived as insensitive and irrelevant, and added to their distress.

The idea that alcohol contributed to the disaster was raised at an early stage, and has proved remarkably durable despite being dismissed by the Taylor Report. The disclosed documents confirm the repeated attempts that were made to find supporting evidence for this.
They also show that available evidence was significantly misinterpreted, including an attempt to establish a link between later arrival and drunkenness that was fundamentally flawed.
The weight placed on alcohol in the face of objective evidence of a pattern of consumption modest for a leisure event was inappropriate. It has since fuelled persistent and unsustainable assertions about drunken fan behaviour.

Disclosed documents provide no rationale for the Coroner's exceptional decision to take samples for blood alcohol measurement from all of the deceased.

The implicit and explicit use of a blood alcohol level of 80mg/100ml as a marker was unjustified. This level has
relevance to the rapid response times of individuals in charge of motor vehicles, but none to people attending a leisure event.

Analysis of the data demonstrates that the attempt to draw statistical correlation between the time of arrival and alcohol level was fundamentally flawed in six respects, and no such link could be deduced.


The weight placed on alcohol levels, particularly in the Coroner's summing up at the inquests, was inappropriate and
misleading. The pattern of alcohol consumption among those who died was unremarkable and not exceptional for a social or leisure occasion.

A document disclosed to the Panel has revealed that an attempt was made to impugn the reputations of the deceased by carrying out Police National Computer checks on those with a non-zero alcohol level.

Documents disclosed to the Panel by SYP show that on the morning after the disaster senior officers discussed privately the 'animalistic behaviour' of 'drunken marauding fans'

The disclosed documents show that in the immediate aftermath of the disaster SYP prioritised an internal investigation and the collection of self-taken, handwritten statements in preparation for the imminent
external inquiries and investigations. SYP Counsel advised that the police should approach its information-gathering exercise by considering themselves 'the accused'. A subsequent SYP internal report ('the Wain Report') informed the SYP submission to the Taylor Inquiry.
Key elements of the SYP submission emphasised exceptional, aggressive and unanticipated crowd behaviour: large numbers of ticketless, drunk and obstinate fans involved in a concerted action, even 'conspiracy', toenter the stadium.
Many of these issues were also raised in Professor Leonard Maunder's advice as one of the assessors to the Taylor Inquiry. The advice from the police assessor, Chief Constable of Lancashire Brian Johnson, criticised SYP's failure to review the 1988 Police Operational Order to identify 'shortcomings'; poor communications between senior officers;
and the consequent failure to divert the crowd away from the tunnel onceGate C had been opened.
The documents disclosed to the Panel show that SYP sought to avoid any admission of liability in the settlement of compensation claims and in contribution proceedings against other organisations. SYP officers who claimed compensation were pressured within the Force to withdraw their claims.
From the documents disclosed to the Panel it is apparent that the decision to gather self-taken recollections from SYP officers, rather than following the standard procedure of contemporaneous pocket-book entries as the foundation for formal Criminal Justice Act statements, originated in the immediate aftermath of the disaster on 16 and 17
April. The initial justification was to provide SYP and the Force solicitors with candid, 'warts-and-all' accounts from officers that would be used to inform SYP's submission to the Taylor Inquiry.
What followed, however, was an extensive process of review and alteration of the recollections and their transition to multi-purpose statements. The disclosed documents reveal confusion about the purpose of recollections, initially taken for SYP 'internal' purposes, and their subsequent use by the WMP investigation. It was brought into stark
relief in the confusion surrounding the status of statements presented to the Taylor Inquiry and the Inquiry's acceptance of the 'final versions' of the reviewed and altered statements.
The process of transition from self-taken recollections to formal Criminal Justice Act statements was presented as removing 'conjecture' and 'opinion' from the former, leaving only matters of 'fact' within thelatter. Disclosed correspondence between SYP and the Force solicitors reveals that comments within officers' statements 'unhelpful to the Force's case' were altered, deleted or qualified (rewritten by the SYP
team).

A significant number of SYP officers were uncomfortable with the methodology adopted in reviewing and altering
their initial accounts and with the role of the SYP solicitors in this process. Senior SYP officers, including the Chief Constable, were aware of these concerns and the disclosed 'Hillsborough updates' demonstrate their attempts to assuage these concerns. An SYP inquiry liaison team was available to provide junior officers with 'necessary information and assistance' prior to giving evidence to the Taylor Inquiry.

Examination of officers' statements shows that officers were discouraged from making criticisms of senior officers' responses, their management and deficiencies in the SYP operational response: 'key' words and descriptions such as 'chaotic' were counselled against and, if included, were deleted.

Some 116 of the 164 statements identified for substantive amendment were amended to remove or alter
comments unfavourable to SYP.

The disclosed documents show that blood alcohol levels were tested in some survivors who attended hospital, as well as in all those who died.
There is no record of these tests or their results in the medical notes of survivors, and in some there was no apparent medical reason for the test. The extent of this testing remains unknown.

There was no evidence to support the proposition that alcohol played any part in the genesis of the disaster and it is regrettable that those in positions of responsibility created and promoted a portrayal of drunkenness as contributing to the occurrence of the disaster and the ensuing loss of life without substantiating evidence.

Detective Chief Superintendent Nick Foster of the WMP investigation team informed the Stuart-Smith Scrutiny that in five out of a sample of six amended statements material should not have been removed. In one case he
'question[ed] the objectivity ... of the person vetting'.

In the days after the disaster the media, particularly the press, published allegations and counter-allegations apportioning blame. This came to a head on 19 April when a number of newspapers, The Sun being the most prominent, reported serious allegations about the behaviour of Liverpool fans before and during the unfolding tragedy. The documents disclosed to the Panel show that the origin of these serious allegations was a local Sheffield press agency informed by several SYP officers, an SYP Police Federation spokeperson and a local MP.
They also demonstrate how the SYP Police Federation, supported informally by the SYP Chief Constable, sought to develop and publicise a version of events that focused on several police officers' allegations of drunkenness, ticketlessness and violence among a large number of Liverpool fans. This extended beyond the media to Parliament.
Yet, from the mass of documents, television and CCTV coverage disclosed to the Panel there is no evidence to support these allegations other than a few isolated examples of aggressive or verbally abusive behaviour
clearly reflecting frustration and desperation.

As the severity of the disaster was becoming apparent, SYP Match Commander, Chief Superintendent David Duckenfield, told a falsehood to senior officials that Liverpool fans had broken into the stadium and caused an inrush into the central pens thus causing the fatal crush. While later discredited, this unfounded allegation was broadcast internationally and was the first explanation of the cause of the disaster to enter the
public domain.

Within days, further serious allegations emerged from unnamed sources, a Police Federation spokesperson and a
local Conservative MP, Irvine Patnick. These were that Liverpool fans had conspired to arrive late, many were without tickets, were exceptionally drunk and aggressive and determined to force entry into
the stadium.

On 19 April, four days after the disaster, The Sun newspaper published a front-page story under the banner headline, 'THE TRUTH', alleging that Liverpool fans had assaulted and urinated on police officers resuscitating the dying, stolen from the dead and verbally sexually abused an unconscious young woman. Although less prominently, and often with a lesser degree of certainty, other regional and national newspapers published similar allegations.

Given the broader press reporting of the allegations, the Panel sought to establish their origins. Documents disclosed to the Panel show that the allegations were filed by White's News Agency, a Sheffield-based company. They were based on meetings over three days between agency staff and several police officers, together with interviews with Irvine Patnick MP and the South Yorkshire Police Federation Secretary, Paul Middup.
From the documents, it is clear that Mr Patnick based his comments on a conversation with police officers on the evening of the disaster.

8 months after the disaster White's News Agency confirmed to the London Evening Standard that its filed stories originated from 'unsolicited' allegations made by 'high ranking' SYP officers to agency 'partners'. There were four separate police sources plus the interview with Mr Patnick. Together these sources were considered sufficient verification for the story to be considered factually accurate and it was distributed accordingly.

A further document records a meeting in Sheffield of Police Federation members on the morning of the publication of the controversial story in The Sun.
The Police Federation Secretary, Mr Middup, confirmed that 'putting our side of the story over to the press and media' had been his priority.

At the meeting police officers repeated many of the allegations published in the media. The Chief Constable joined the meeting and advised that the SYP case had to be pulled together and given to the Inquiry. A 'defence' had to be prepared and a 'rock solid story' presented.

Lord Justice Taylor's Interim Report condemned the evidence and testimony of senior police officers and rejected as exaggerated the allegations made against Liverpool fans. He stated categorically that fans' behaviour played no part in the disaster.

The meeting's afternoon session heard from unnamed police officers who repeated the allegations of exceptional levels of abuse, drunkenness and violence.

Consistent with Lord Justice Taylor's findings, the Panel found no evidence among the vast number of disclosed documents and many hours of video material to verify the serious allegations of exceptional levels
of drunkenness, ticketlessness or violence among Liverpool fans. There was no evidence that fans had conspired to arrive late at the stadium and force entry and no evidence that they stole from the dead and dying.
Documents show that fans became frustrated by the inadequate response to the unfolding tragedy. The vast majority of fans on the pitch assisted in rescuing and evacuating the injured and the dead.

I don't see things from any other perspective than what I have since I stopped believing everything about my (political) enemies or friends. This occurred many years before I joined up, Petty. I have not changed my 'rule of thumb' since, which is trying to look at things as objectively as I can no matter what my job, race, sex, religion, or other political perspective is.

There clearly has been an effort made by certain police to minimalize any fault the police overall may have had - and possibly/probably some down right lying - but nothing I have said is dissuaded by the findings above. A Coroner of the time saw the same evidence but prsumably drew a different view on the matter at hand. In another fourty years, maybe a new investigator will view the same evidence and apportion more blame somewhere else and less on the police. The above stuff almost says: "The police let in too many people and sholuld have known full well that the very likely outcome of that was around (or exactly!) 96 people being crushed to death."

Again, I can see things went wrong - and police are not at all blameless - but it is always easier to see things in hindsight, change procedures and methods after the fact, then look back having learned lessons and know that you would have predicted everything better and read the situation that occurred and run things better. We know now that letting in too fans can easily lead to absolute chaos. But laying ALL the blame at one group is a cop out - excuse the pun - and to not seek answers that are free of scapegoating is a poor way of doing things.

Again - and I have no hesitation in saying it again - the police clearly could have done things better, and no one likes arse-covering liars, but this whole investigation seems to reek to me of a Witch Hunt. The investigators seem to have found exactly what they were looking for. I'm not going to try and deconstruct line by line what you posted above, Petty (or try to add further and/or different perpectives to the perspectives given). This is one of those things where we'll have to agree to disagree. (NO! I don't think the police were blameless!!!)

Anyway, I'm a cop, and anything I say can only be seen as being irremedially tainted by the fact I am one! I quote: Orwell I can understand that as a cop you tend to view things form that perspective- but in this case I feel you are defending the undefensible. Don't agree wit that! Yes, having been a cop a long time suggests (I think correctly!) that my inside knowledge and experience of how police do things is deeper than that of those outside the job - as an Aged Care worker would tend to have a deeper knowledge and experience of Aged Care related things - but I don't think that makes me automatically defend police no matter what. Sadly, I fear that the more I would say that, and the more I presented arguments to support my denial, the more folk would 'tend' to think your statement to be objectively true. A Witch Hunt is always preferable to an unbiased investigation in all manner of situations.

On another thing we were discussing here. I've mulled over the issue of 'offensive behaviour' regards our t-shirt wearer. I think that maybe the matter should not have been prosecuted in retrospect. I'm serious. It was not thrust directly into the face of the victim's family, who the prick clearly didn't know, so I guess it's the kind of thing a free society must tolerate. I do wonder though, if a friend or relative (presumably still torn up with grief) had met him in the street and punched and kicked him to death, would it be seen as a reasonable 'defense' in Brittain? 'Provocation' is not a defense in Victorian Criminal Law. (That's Victorian as in Victoria, Australia btw).